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CASE DIGEST ON ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES [243 SCRA 32 (1995)] - F: This is an administrative complaint filed by Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against J. Brillantes, Presiding Judge of MTC, Mla. It was alleged in the complaint that Brillantes has been cohabiting w/ Yolanda De Castro (w/ whom Atienza had 2 children) when he (Brillantes) was already married to one Zenaida Ongkiko w/ whom he has 5 children. xxx Resp. denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having 5 children w/ her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony, the same was not valid for lack of marriage license. The second marriage bet. the two also lacked the required license. He claims that when he married De Castro in LA, California, he believed, in all GF and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single bec. his first marriage was solemnized w/o a license.
HELD: Under the FC, there must be a judicial decl. of the nullity of a previous marriage bef. a party thereto can enter into a 2nd marriage. (Art. 40.) Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the FC regardless of the date of the first marriage. Said art. is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance w/ the NCC or other laws." (Art. 256, FC.) This is particularly true w/ Art. 40 w/c is a rule of procedure. Resp. has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Art. 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
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Thursday, November 11, 2010
CASE DIGEST ON DOMINGO V. CA
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CASE DIGEST ON DOMINGO V. CA [226 SCRA 572 (1993)] - A spouse may petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage for a purpose other than her remarriage.
F: Delia Domingo filed a pet. for decl. of nullity of her marriage w/ Roberto Domingo, on the ground that, unknown to her, he was previously married at the time of their marriage. She prays that their marriage be declared null and void and, as a consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him.
Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the petition for decl. of nullity is unnecessary citing Peo. v. Aragon and Peo. v. Mendoza. Roberto claims that decl of nullity is necessary under Art. 40, FC only for the purpose of remarriage. The lower court denied the motion. CA affirmed the denial.
HELD: The Declaration of nullity of a marriage under Art. 40 may be resorted to even for a purpose other than remarriage.
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Art. 40 is the position of the word "solely." xxx. As it is placed, it is meant to qualify "final judgment." Had the provision been stated as follows: "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage...," the word "solely" will qualify "for purposes of remarriage" and the husband would have been correct.
That Art. 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
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CASE DIGEST ON DOMINGO V. CA [226 SCRA 572 (1993)] - A spouse may petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage for a purpose other than her remarriage.
F: Delia Domingo filed a pet. for decl. of nullity of her marriage w/ Roberto Domingo, on the ground that, unknown to her, he was previously married at the time of their marriage. She prays that their marriage be declared null and void and, as a consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him.
Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the petition for decl. of nullity is unnecessary citing Peo. v. Aragon and Peo. v. Mendoza. Roberto claims that decl of nullity is necessary under Art. 40, FC only for the purpose of remarriage. The lower court denied the motion. CA affirmed the denial.
HELD: The Declaration of nullity of a marriage under Art. 40 may be resorted to even for a purpose other than remarriage.
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Art. 40 is the position of the word "solely." xxx. As it is placed, it is meant to qualify "final judgment." Had the provision been stated as follows: "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage...," the word "solely" will qualify "for purposes of remarriage" and the husband would have been correct.
That Art. 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
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CASE DIGEST ON MARTINEZ VS. TAN
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Martinez v. Tan [12 P 731] -- F: Pltff. Rosalia Martinez commenced this action for the cancellation of the cert. of marriage and for damages. Pltff. claimed that what took place before the justice of the peace did not constitute a legal marriage under Gen. Orders No. 68, Sec. 6, "No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife." CFI found for def.
HELD: The parties addressed a signed petition to the justice of the peace stating that they had agreed to marry, and asking the justice of the peace to marry them. Before the justice of the peace, they stated under oath that they ratified the contents of their petition and insisted on what they asked for. This statement was signed by them, in the presence of witnesses that they produced. A certificate was then made out by the justice of the peace, signed by him and the witnesses, stating the parties had been married by him. Both the parties knew the contents of the document w/c they signed. Under the circumstances, what took place before the justice of the peace amounted to a marriage.
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Martinez v. Tan [12 P 731] -- F: Pltff. Rosalia Martinez commenced this action for the cancellation of the cert. of marriage and for damages. Pltff. claimed that what took place before the justice of the peace did not constitute a legal marriage under Gen. Orders No. 68, Sec. 6, "No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife." CFI found for def.
HELD: The parties addressed a signed petition to the justice of the peace stating that they had agreed to marry, and asking the justice of the peace to marry them. Before the justice of the peace, they stated under oath that they ratified the contents of their petition and insisted on what they asked for. This statement was signed by them, in the presence of witnesses that they produced. A certificate was then made out by the justice of the peace, signed by him and the witnesses, stating the parties had been married by him. Both the parties knew the contents of the document w/c they signed. Under the circumstances, what took place before the justice of the peace amounted to a marriage.
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CASE DIGEST ON Goitia v. Campos Rueda
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CASE DIGEST ON Goitia v. Campos Rueda [35 P 252] -- F: This is an action for support by G (wife) against R (husband). After 1 mo. of marriage, R repeatedly demanded from G to perform "unchaste and lascivious acts on R's genitals." Bec. of G's refusal, R maltreated G by word and deed, inflicting bodily injuries on G. To escape R's lewd designs and avoid further harm, G left the conjugal home and took refuge in her parent's house. G filed an action for support w/ the trial court. this was dismissed on the ground that R could not be compelled to give support if G lived outside of the conjugal home, unless there was legal sep. G appealed.
HELD: Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of w/c rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law w/c defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations. Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of w/c in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make. The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to time and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or govt upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
The law provides that the H, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the H to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home bec. of the H's own wrongful acts. In this case, where the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode bec. of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the H, the W may claim support from the H for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.
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CASE DIGEST ON Goitia v. Campos Rueda [35 P 252] -- F: This is an action for support by G (wife) against R (husband). After 1 mo. of marriage, R repeatedly demanded from G to perform "unchaste and lascivious acts on R's genitals." Bec. of G's refusal, R maltreated G by word and deed, inflicting bodily injuries on G. To escape R's lewd designs and avoid further harm, G left the conjugal home and took refuge in her parent's house. G filed an action for support w/ the trial court. this was dismissed on the ground that R could not be compelled to give support if G lived outside of the conjugal home, unless there was legal sep. G appealed.
HELD: Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of w/c rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law w/c defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations. Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of w/c in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make. The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to time and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or govt upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
The law provides that the H, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the H to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home bec. of the H's own wrongful acts. In this case, where the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode bec. of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the H, the W may claim support from the H for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.
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CASE DIGEST ON BARLIN V. RAMIREZ
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CASE DIGEST ON BARLIN V. RAMIREZ [7 P 41] - F: The def., Ramirez, having been appointed by the pltff parish priest, took possession of the church on 7/5/01. He administered if as such under the orders of his superiors until 11/14/02. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this def. for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other prop. of the church. The def., by a written document of that date, refused to make such delivery, stating that "the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction w/ the parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/ the Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and to join the Filipino Church, the head of w/c is at Mla.
In 1/4, the pltff. brought this action against def., alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church bldg, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other prop. belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof and that the def. render an account of the prop. w/c he had received and w/c was retained by him, and for other relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of the pltff.
HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made with reference to an institution w/c antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe, and w/c existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshipped in the temple of Mecca," does not require serious consideration.
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CASE DIGEST ON BARLIN V. RAMIREZ [7 P 41] - F: The def., Ramirez, having been appointed by the pltff parish priest, took possession of the church on 7/5/01. He administered if as such under the orders of his superiors until 11/14/02. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this def. for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other prop. of the church. The def., by a written document of that date, refused to make such delivery, stating that "the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction w/ the parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/ the Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and to join the Filipino Church, the head of w/c is at Mla.
In 1/4, the pltff. brought this action against def., alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church bldg, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other prop. belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof and that the def. render an account of the prop. w/c he had received and w/c was retained by him, and for other relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of the pltff.
HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made with reference to an institution w/c antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe, and w/c existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshipped in the temple of Mecca," does not require serious consideration.
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CASE DIGEST ON GELUZ V. CA
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CASE DIGEST ON GELUZ V. CA [2 S 801 (1961)] - F: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948-- thru her aunt. In 1950, she became preganant by her present husband before they were legally married. During to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, she had herself aborted by def. After the marriage w/ the pltff., she again became pregnant. As she was employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by def. in Oct 1953. Less than 2 years later, she again became pregnant. On 2/21/55, she again repaired to the def's clinic. Nita was again aborted of a 2-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes pltff's basis in filing this action and award of damages The CA and the trial court predicated the award of damages upon the provisions of the initial par. of Art. 2206 of the NCC.
RULING: This award, we believe, to be error for the said art., in fixing an award for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed w/ personality.
RATIO: Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf. A husband of a woman who voluntarily procured her abortion could not recover damages from the physician who caused the same. (1) Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of person¬al injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could deriva¬tively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Cod, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article." In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
(2) This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would nor¬mally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Art. 2217, CC), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, CC). But in this case, there is no basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the husband's indifference to the previous abortions clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affection.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intrauterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
Tolentino: Separation from Mother.-- This is produced by the cutting of the umbilical cord, whether the removal takes place naturally or by surgical operation.
Alive at Birth.-- The duration of extra-uterine life is immaterial; for acquisition of juridical personality, it is enough that the child lives even for an instant.
Test of Life.-- The general opinion is that independent life required for juridical personality can be shown only by complete respiration. The cry of the child, although it is not a necessary sign of life, is evidence that it has acquired complete respiration. Another indication of complete respiration is the floating of the lungs when placed in water; this means that air has penetrated into the lungs by breathing.
Viability Not Required.-- Viability means that the child is capable of living, and this is determined by the extent of the development of its organs.
Premature Birth.-- In this case, if the child does not live 24 hours completely separated from the mother's womb, it does not acquire juridical personality. This is an absolute requirement for feotuses w/c have an intrauterine life of less than 7 mos. (Balane quoting Manresa and JBL.)
"The aborted creature does not reach the category of a natural person and consequently is not born in the contemplation of law." (Geluz v. CA, supra.)
This is so, even if the child is killed before the period lapses and it can be proved that it could have survived that period if it had not been prevented by the wilful act of another. On the other hand, juridical personality is acquired even if the survival for 24 hours is caused only by medical or scientific means w/o w/c the child would have died before the lapse of that period.
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CASE DIGEST ON GELUZ V. CA [2 S 801 (1961)] - F: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948-- thru her aunt. In 1950, she became preganant by her present husband before they were legally married. During to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, she had herself aborted by def. After the marriage w/ the pltff., she again became pregnant. As she was employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by def. in Oct 1953. Less than 2 years later, she again became pregnant. On 2/21/55, she again repaired to the def's clinic. Nita was again aborted of a 2-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes pltff's basis in filing this action and award of damages The CA and the trial court predicated the award of damages upon the provisions of the initial par. of Art. 2206 of the NCC.
RULING: This award, we believe, to be error for the said art., in fixing an award for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed w/ personality.
RATIO: Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf. A husband of a woman who voluntarily procured her abortion could not recover damages from the physician who caused the same. (1) Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of person¬al injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could deriva¬tively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Cod, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article." In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
(2) This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would nor¬mally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Art. 2217, CC), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, CC). But in this case, there is no basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the husband's indifference to the previous abortions clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affection.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intrauterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
Tolentino: Separation from Mother.-- This is produced by the cutting of the umbilical cord, whether the removal takes place naturally or by surgical operation.
Alive at Birth.-- The duration of extra-uterine life is immaterial; for acquisition of juridical personality, it is enough that the child lives even for an instant.
Test of Life.-- The general opinion is that independent life required for juridical personality can be shown only by complete respiration. The cry of the child, although it is not a necessary sign of life, is evidence that it has acquired complete respiration. Another indication of complete respiration is the floating of the lungs when placed in water; this means that air has penetrated into the lungs by breathing.
Viability Not Required.-- Viability means that the child is capable of living, and this is determined by the extent of the development of its organs.
Premature Birth.-- In this case, if the child does not live 24 hours completely separated from the mother's womb, it does not acquire juridical personality. This is an absolute requirement for feotuses w/c have an intrauterine life of less than 7 mos. (Balane quoting Manresa and JBL.)
"The aborted creature does not reach the category of a natural person and consequently is not born in the contemplation of law." (Geluz v. CA, supra.)
This is so, even if the child is killed before the period lapses and it can be proved that it could have survived that period if it had not been prevented by the wilful act of another. On the other hand, juridical personality is acquired even if the survival for 24 hours is caused only by medical or scientific means w/o w/c the child would have died before the lapse of that period.
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CASE DIGEST ON JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO
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CASE DIGEST ON JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO [93 P 257] - F: On 2/6/45, while the battle for the liberation of Mla. was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. (JN, Sr.) and Angela Joaquin (AJ), together w/ their 3 daughters and their son Joaquin, Jr. (JN, Jr.) and the latter's wife, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club. During their stay, the bldg. was packed w/ refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the bldg, especially those who were trying to escape. the 3 daughters were hit and fell on the ground near the entrance; and JN, Sr. and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer haven. They could not convince AJ, who refused to join them, and so JN, Sr. and his son, JN, Jr. and the latter's wife dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, JN, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people, presumably including AJ. JN, Sr., Mrs. JN, Jr. managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby and stayed there for about 3 days, until they were forced to leave bec. the shelling tore it open. They fled but unfortunately met Japanese patrols who fired at them, killing the two.
The trial court found the deaths to have occurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd. JN, Jr.; 3rd. AJ; 4th. JN, Sr. The CA found that the deaths occurred in the following order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd. AJ; 3rd. JN, Jr.; 4th JN, Sr.
HELD: Where there are facts, known or knowable, from w/c a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption (in the Rules of Court) does not step in, and the rules of preponderance of evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from w/c reasonable inference of survivorship bet. AJ and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' (the sole witness) testimony competent and sufficient for the purpose?
It is our opinion that the testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship bet. AJ and JN, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that JN, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. JN, Jr., was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from the Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in 5 seconds or less, and so died w/in that interval from the time he dashed out of the bldg. AJ could have perished w/in those 5 or fewer seconds, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote.
According to Lopez' testimony, the collapse of the club occurred about 40 minutes after JN, Jr. died, and it was the collapse that killed AJ. The CA said that the interval bet. JN, Jr.'s death and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes." Even so, it was much longer than 5 seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that AJ was still alive when her son expired.
The CA mentioned several causes, besides the bldg's collapse, by which AJ could have been killed. All these causes are speculative. xxx Nor was AJ likely to have been killed by falling beams bec. the bldg. was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly, not w/in the brief space of 5 seconds bet. her son's departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Sec. 69 (ii) of R 123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from w/c it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact."
In conclusion, the presumption that AJ died before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures w/o any sure foundation in evidence. The opposite theory is deduced from established facts w/c, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by w/c civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail.
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CASE DIGEST ON JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO [93 P 257] - F: On 2/6/45, while the battle for the liberation of Mla. was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. (JN, Sr.) and Angela Joaquin (AJ), together w/ their 3 daughters and their son Joaquin, Jr. (JN, Jr.) and the latter's wife, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club. During their stay, the bldg. was packed w/ refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the bldg, especially those who were trying to escape. the 3 daughters were hit and fell on the ground near the entrance; and JN, Sr. and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer haven. They could not convince AJ, who refused to join them, and so JN, Sr. and his son, JN, Jr. and the latter's wife dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, JN, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people, presumably including AJ. JN, Sr., Mrs. JN, Jr. managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby and stayed there for about 3 days, until they were forced to leave bec. the shelling tore it open. They fled but unfortunately met Japanese patrols who fired at them, killing the two.
The trial court found the deaths to have occurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd. JN, Jr.; 3rd. AJ; 4th. JN, Sr. The CA found that the deaths occurred in the following order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd. AJ; 3rd. JN, Jr.; 4th JN, Sr.
HELD: Where there are facts, known or knowable, from w/c a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption (in the Rules of Court) does not step in, and the rules of preponderance of evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from w/c reasonable inference of survivorship bet. AJ and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' (the sole witness) testimony competent and sufficient for the purpose?
It is our opinion that the testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship bet. AJ and JN, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that JN, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. JN, Jr., was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from the Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in 5 seconds or less, and so died w/in that interval from the time he dashed out of the bldg. AJ could have perished w/in those 5 or fewer seconds, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote.
According to Lopez' testimony, the collapse of the club occurred about 40 minutes after JN, Jr. died, and it was the collapse that killed AJ. The CA said that the interval bet. JN, Jr.'s death and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes." Even so, it was much longer than 5 seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that AJ was still alive when her son expired.
The CA mentioned several causes, besides the bldg's collapse, by which AJ could have been killed. All these causes are speculative. xxx Nor was AJ likely to have been killed by falling beams bec. the bldg. was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly, not w/in the brief space of 5 seconds bet. her son's departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Sec. 69 (ii) of R 123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from w/c it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact."
In conclusion, the presumption that AJ died before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures w/o any sure foundation in evidence. The opposite theory is deduced from established facts w/c, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by w/c civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail.
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CASE DIGEST ON LANDICHO V. RELOVA
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CASE DIGEST ON LANDICHO V. RELOVA [22 S 731 (1968)] - Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against the husband, and later the second wife filed a civil case for annulment of the marriage on the ground of force and intimidation, and the husband later files a civil case for annulment of marriage against the first wife, the civil cases are not prejudicial questions in the determination of his criminal liability for bigamy, since his consent to the second marriage is not in issue.
"The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage ceremo¬nies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the peti¬tioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only later that petitioner as defendant in the civil action, filed a third party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of a competent court and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declara¬tion of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."
PRESUMPTION OF SIMULTANEOUS DEATH
Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.
Tolentino: Application of Article.-- This article applies only when the question of survivorship involves persons "who are called to succeed each other." Hence, it cannot apply to other cases w/c do not involve succession.
When the persons involved would succeed each other, however, then this article applies, whether the death be actual or merely presumed from absence or other circumstances.
Are Rules of Court Repealed?-- There is every indication that the Code Commission intended to repeal the presumptions on survivorship under the Rules of Court, because the presumptions laid down therein are sometimes absurd and mere guesswork. [I Tolentino 176]
Compare with Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj), (kk)
PRESUMPTION OF PRIORITY OF DEATH (Survivorship Agreement)
Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj). That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived; if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time. (Rules of Court.)
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CASE DIGEST ON LANDICHO V. RELOVA [22 S 731 (1968)] - Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against the husband, and later the second wife filed a civil case for annulment of the marriage on the ground of force and intimidation, and the husband later files a civil case for annulment of marriage against the first wife, the civil cases are not prejudicial questions in the determination of his criminal liability for bigamy, since his consent to the second marriage is not in issue.
"The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage ceremo¬nies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the peti¬tioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only later that petitioner as defendant in the civil action, filed a third party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of a competent court and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declara¬tion of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."
PRESUMPTION OF SIMULTANEOUS DEATH
Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.
Tolentino: Application of Article.-- This article applies only when the question of survivorship involves persons "who are called to succeed each other." Hence, it cannot apply to other cases w/c do not involve succession.
When the persons involved would succeed each other, however, then this article applies, whether the death be actual or merely presumed from absence or other circumstances.
Are Rules of Court Repealed?-- There is every indication that the Code Commission intended to repeal the presumptions on survivorship under the Rules of Court, because the presumptions laid down therein are sometimes absurd and mere guesswork. [I Tolentino 176]
Compare with Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj), (kk)
PRESUMPTION OF PRIORITY OF DEATH (Survivorship Agreement)
Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj). That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived; if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time. (Rules of Court.)
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CASE DIGEST ON MERCED V. DIAZ
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CASE DIGEST ON MERCED V. DIAZ [109 P 156 (1960)] - Where the husband files a civil case for annulment of the second marriage on the ground of lack of consent, and the second wife subsequently files a criminal case for bigamy against him, the civil case for annulment is a prejudicial question to be determined before the criminal case can proceed. Consent is an essential element of a valid marriage. Without consent, the marriage is void. But the question of invalidity cannot ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the second marriage, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case, and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.
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CASE DIGEST ON MERCED V. DIAZ [109 P 156 (1960)] - Where the husband files a civil case for annulment of the second marriage on the ground of lack of consent, and the second wife subsequently files a criminal case for bigamy against him, the civil case for annulment is a prejudicial question to be determined before the criminal case can proceed. Consent is an essential element of a valid marriage. Without consent, the marriage is void. But the question of invalidity cannot ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the second marriage, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case, and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.
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CASE DIGEST ON MADEJA V. CARO
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CASE DIGEST ON MADEJA V. CARO [126 S 295 (1983)] - Where accused was charged with Homicide thru reckless impru-dence, pending the criminal action, an independent civil action under Art. 33 may proceed independ¬ently of the criminal case. Citing Carandang v. Santiago [97 P 94 (1955)], "The term "physical injuries" is used in the generic sence, not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homi¬cide." Defamation and fraud are also used in their generic sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein.
Art. 35. When a person, claimining to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecut¬ing attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promul¬gate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.
Rule 111, Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. - The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (Rules of Court.)
Rule 111, Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investiga¬tion. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action any time before the prosecution rests. (ibid.)
Bigamy - Art. 349, RPC. Contracting of second or subsequent marriage:
a. before legal dissolution of first marriage
b. before declaration of presumptive death of absent spouse.
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CASE DIGEST ON MADEJA V. CARO [126 S 295 (1983)] - Where accused was charged with Homicide thru reckless impru-dence, pending the criminal action, an independent civil action under Art. 33 may proceed independ¬ently of the criminal case. Citing Carandang v. Santiago [97 P 94 (1955)], "The term "physical injuries" is used in the generic sence, not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homi¬cide." Defamation and fraud are also used in their generic sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein.
Art. 35. When a person, claimining to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecut¬ing attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promul¬gate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.
Rule 111, Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. - The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (Rules of Court.)
Rule 111, Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investiga¬tion. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action any time before the prosecution rests. (ibid.)
Bigamy - Art. 349, RPC. Contracting of second or subsequent marriage:
a. before legal dissolution of first marriage
b. before declaration of presumptive death of absent spouse.
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