Case Digests of Supreme Court Decisions: November 2010

Thursday, November 11, 2010

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CASE DIGEST ON GELUZ V. CA [2 S 801 (1961)] - F: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948-- thru her aunt. In 1950, she became preganant by her present husband before they were legally married. During to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, she had herself aborted by def. After the marriage w/ the pltff., she again became pregnant. As she was employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by def. in Oct 1953. Less than 2 years later, she again became pregnant. On 2/21/55, she again repaired to the def's clinic. Nita was again aborted of a 2-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes pltff's basis in filing this action and award of damages The CA and the trial court predicated the award of damages upon the provisions of the initial par. of Art. 2206 of the NCC.
RULING: This award, we believe, to be error for the said art., in fixing an award for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed w/ personality.
RATIO: Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf. A husband of a woman who voluntarily procured her abortion could not recover damages from the physician who caused the same. (1) Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of person¬al injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could deriva¬tively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Cod, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article." In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
(2) This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would nor¬mally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Art. 2217, CC), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, CC). But in this case, there is no basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the husband's indifference to the previous abortions clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affection.

Art. 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intrauterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

Tolentino: Separation from Mother.-- This is produced by the cutting of the umbilical cord, whether the removal takes place naturally or by surgical operation.

Alive at Birth.-- The duration of extra-uterine life is immaterial; for acquisition of juridical personality, it is enough that the child lives even for an instant.
Test of Life.-- The general opinion is that independent life required for juridical personality can be shown only by complete respiration. The cry of the child, although it is not a necessary sign of life, is evidence that it has acquired complete respiration. Another indication of complete respiration is the floating of the lungs when placed in water; this means that air has penetrated into the lungs by breathing.
Viability Not Required.-- Viability means that the child is capable of living, and this is determined by the extent of the development of its organs.

Premature Birth.-- In this case, if the child does not live 24 hours completely separated from the mother's womb, it does not acquire juridical personality. This is an absolute requirement for feotuses w/c have an intrauterine life of less than 7 mos. (Balane quoting Manresa and JBL.)
"The aborted creature does not reach the category of a natural person and consequently is not born in the contemplation of law." (Geluz v. CA, supra.)

This is so, even if the child is killed before the period lapses and it can be proved that it could have survived that period if it had not been prevented by the wilful act of another. On the other hand, juridical personality is acquired even if the survival for 24 hours is caused only by medical or scientific means w/o w/c the child would have died before the lapse of that period.

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CASE DIGEST ON JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO

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CASE DIGEST ON JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO [93 P 257] - F: On 2/6/45, while the battle for the liberation of Mla. was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. (JN, Sr.) and Angela Joaquin (AJ), together w/ their 3 daughters and their son Joaquin, Jr. (JN, Jr.) and the latter's wife, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club. During their stay, the bldg. was packed w/ refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the bldg, especially those who were trying to escape. the 3 daughters were hit and fell on the ground near the entrance; and JN, Sr. and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer haven. They could not convince AJ, who refused to join them, and so JN, Sr. and his son, JN, Jr. and the latter's wife dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, JN, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people, presumably including AJ. JN, Sr., Mrs. JN, Jr. managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby and stayed there for about 3 days, until they were forced to leave bec. the shelling tore it open. They fled but unfortunately met Japanese patrols who fired at them, killing the two.
The trial court found the deaths to have occurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd. JN, Jr.; 3rd. AJ; 4th. JN, Sr. The CA found that the deaths occurred in the following order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd. AJ; 3rd. JN, Jr.; 4th JN, Sr.

HELD: Where there are facts, known or knowable, from w/c a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption (in the Rules of Court) does not step in, and the rules of preponderance of evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from w/c reasonable inference of survivorship bet. AJ and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' (the sole witness) testimony competent and sufficient for the purpose?
It is our opinion that the testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship bet. AJ and JN, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that JN, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. JN, Jr., was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from the Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in 5 seconds or less, and so died w/in that interval from the time he dashed out of the bldg. AJ could have perished w/in those 5 or fewer seconds, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote.
According to Lopez' testimony, the collapse of the club occurred about 40 minutes after JN, Jr. died, and it was the collapse that killed AJ. The CA said that the interval bet. JN, Jr.'s death and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes." Even so, it was much longer than 5 seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that AJ was still alive when her son expired.
The CA mentioned several causes, besides the bldg's collapse, by which AJ could have been killed. All these causes are speculative. xxx Nor was AJ likely to have been killed by falling beams bec. the bldg. was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly, not w/in the brief space of 5 seconds bet. her son's departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Sec. 69 (ii) of R 123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from w/c it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact."
In conclusion, the presumption that AJ died before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures w/o any sure foundation in evidence. The opposite theory is deduced from established facts w/c, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by w/c civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail.

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CASE DIGEST ON LANDICHO V. RELOVA

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CASE DIGEST ON LANDICHO V. RELOVA [22 S 731 (1968)] - Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against the husband, and later the second wife filed a civil case for annulment of the marriage on the ground of force and intimidation, and the husband later files a civil case for annulment of marriage against the first wife, the civil cases are not prejudicial questions in the determination of his criminal liability for bigamy, since his consent to the second marriage is not in issue.
"The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage ceremo¬nies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the peti¬tioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only later that petitioner as defendant in the civil action, filed a third party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of a competent court and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declara¬tion of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."

PRESUMPTION OF SIMULTANEOUS DEATH

Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.

Tolentino: Application of Article.-- This article applies only when the question of survivorship involves persons "who are called to succeed each other." Hence, it cannot apply to other cases w/c do not involve succession.
When the persons involved would succeed each other, however, then this article applies, whether the death be actual or merely presumed from absence or other circumstances.

Are Rules of Court Repealed?-- There is every indication that the Code Commission intended to repeal the presumptions on survivorship under the Rules of Court, because the presumptions laid down therein are sometimes absurd and mere guesswork. [I Tolentino 176]

Compare with Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj), (kk)

PRESUMPTION OF PRIORITY OF DEATH (Survivorship Agreement)

Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj). That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived; if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time. (Rules of Court.)

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CASE DIGEST ON MERCED V. DIAZ

CASE DIGEST ON MADEJA V. CARO

CASE DIGEST ON ESCUETA V. FANDIALAN

CASE DIGEST ON ABELLANA V. MARAVE

CASE DIGEST ON REYES V. SEMPIO-DY

CASE DIGEST ON PADILLA V. CA

CASE DIGEST ON MENDOZA V. ARRIETA

CASE DIGEST ON MENDOZA V. ALCALA

CASE DIGEST ON AYER V. CAPULONG

CASE DIGEST ON LAGUNZAD V. GONZALES

CASE DIGEST ON GLOBE MACKAY V. CA

CASE DIGEST ON BELLIS V. BELLIS

CASE DIGEST ON AZNAR V. GARCIA

CASE DIGEST ON VAN DORN V. ROMILLO

CASE DIGEST OF TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO

CASE DIGEST ON NAMARCO V. TECSON

CASE DIGEST OF YAO KEE V. SY-GONZALES

Case Digest on People vs. Pinuila

Case Digest on People vs. Licera

PEOPLE V. LICERA [65 S 270 (1975)] - F: In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret agent of Governor Leviste. In 1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. The SC held that where at the time of his appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was applicable, which held that secret agents were exempt from the license requirement, and later People v. Mapa (1967) was decided, the earlier case should be held applicable.

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HELD: Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in them¬selves not law, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.
A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule.

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Case Digest on People vs. Donato

PEOPLE V. DONATO [198 S 130 (1991)] - The doctrine of waiver extends to the rights and privileges of any character, and since the word "waiver" covers any conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled whether secured by contract, conferred

with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privi¬leges do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy.
Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) Those in which the state, as well as the accused, is interested, and (b) those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot be waived, those of the second may be. (Commonwealth v. Petrillo).
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as the rights against unreason¬able searches and seizures, the right to counsel and to remain silent, and the right to be heard.
The right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

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Case Digest of Kasilag vs. Rodriguez

KASILAG V. RODRIGUEZ [ 69 P 217] - F: Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio (EA).
The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. In clause V, the parties stipulated that EA was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 yrs, the debt w/ interest thereon, in w/c event the mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI, the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land; in clause VII, it was covenanted that w/in 30 days from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in the CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of RA 496; in clause VIII the parties agreed that should EA fail to redeem the mortgage w/in the stipulated period of 4 1/2 yrs, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion to be presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-Bataan, the contract of sale of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all its force.
One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that EA was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon.

HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements, bec. the such contract is a lien and as such is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The CA held that petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of the land bec. he knew that the contract he made w/ EA was an absolute sale, and further, that the latter could not sell the land bec. it is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act 2874.
xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in BF when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by w/c it is invalidated.

The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in GF bec. he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the question is w/n GF may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.

Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of GF but excusable ignorance may be such basis (if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant w/ the laws bec. he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of GF.
The petitioners being in GF, the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties.

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Case Digest of Tanada vs. Tuvera

TANADA V. TUVERA [136 S 27] - F: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in the Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents contend, among others that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the OG is indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of NCC.

HELD: The interpretation given by respondent is in accord w/ this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the OG is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-- for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, w/c is the 15th day following its publication-- but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondent's argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws w/ the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Art. 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the OG, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
xxx The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. The clear object of the law is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws w/c are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. W/o such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of w/c he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. It is needless to say that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.

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Case Digest on People vs. Veridiano II

PEOPLE V. VERIDIANO II [132 s 523] - F: Private resp. Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged w/ violation of BP 22. Before he could be arraigned, Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that the info. did not charge an offense, pointing out that at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, w/c was about the 2nd week of May '79 (date of issue of the check), BP 22 has not yet taken effect. The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of the check, 9/26/79, is the date of the commission of the offense. Resolving the motion, the court granted the same and held that BP 22 cannot be given a retroactive effect to apply to the case. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner submitting for review respondent Judge's dismissal of the criminal case.

HELD: When private resp. Go Bio, Jr. committed the act complained of in May '79 (at the time he issued the check-- the law penalizes the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and not only the fact of its dishonor), there was no law penalizing such act. Following the special provision of BP 22, it became effective only on 6/29/79. The copy editor of the OG made a certification that the penal statute in question was made public only on 6/14/79 and not on the printed date 4/9/79. Differently stated, 6/14/79 was the date of publication of BP 22. Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed of its contents. For, it a statute had not been published before its viol., then, in the eyes of the law, there was no such law to be violated and, consequently the accused could not have committed the alleged crime.
The effectivity clause of BP 22 states that "This Act shall take effect 15 days after publication in the OG." The term "publication" in such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, i.e., to make known to the people in general. If the legislature had intended to make the printed date of issue of the OG as the point of reference, then it could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of BP 22.

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Case Digest of Pesigan v. Angeles

PESIGAN V. ANGELES [129 S 174] - F: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu 10-wheeler truck in the evening of 4/2/82 26 carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur w/ P. Garcia, Batangas as destination. Inspite of the permit to transport and the health certificate and 3 other certificates of inspection, the carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte,
were confiscated by the town's police station commander and the provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was based on EO 626-A w/c provided for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another. The Pesigans filed against the two officials an action for replevin for the recovery of carabaos. The case was dismissed for lack of cause of action. Hence, this appeal under R 45 of the ROC.

HELD: We hold that said EO should not be enforced against the Pesigans on 4/2/82 bec it is a penal regulation (the confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes EO 626-A a penal statute) published more than 2 mos. later in the OG dated 6/14/82. It became effective only 15 days thereafter as provided in Art. 2, NCC and Sec. 11 of the Revised Admin. Code.
The word "laws" in Art. 2 includes circulars and regulations w/c prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

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Case Digest on UMALI V. ESTANISLAO [209 S 446 (1992)]

UMALI V. ESTANISLAO [209 S 446 (1992)] - Reiterating Tanada v. Tuvera, The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen (15) day period shall be shortened or extended.

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Case Digests of Supreme Court Decisions