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CASE DIGEST ON ESCUETA V. FANDIALAN [61 S 278 (1974)] - Where the cause of action for physical injuries accrued in 1952, and a criminal action for Frustrated Homicide was filed in 1955 and a reservation of civil action was made, and a civil action for damages was filed in 1956 but was dismissed for lack of interest, when the civil action was refiled in 1968, the said civil action has already prescribed. Since there was a reservation of the civil action, the prescription period for an action based on tort applies, which is 4 years from cause of action [Art. 1146 (1)]. Furthermore, no reservation was even required since it is an independent civil action under Art. 33.
Had no reservation been made, the civil case would have been impliedly instituted with the criminal, and since accused was convicted in 1955, an action to enforce judgment would only expire after ten years from judgment [Art. 1144 (3)].
Thus, where the offended party reserves the right to file a separate action for damages arising from physical injuries, the cause of action prescribes in four years, not ten years.
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Thursday, November 11, 2010
CASE DIGEST ON ABELLANA V. MARAVE
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CASE DIGEST ON ABELLANA V. MARAVE [57 S 106 (1974)] - Where accused appealed his conviction by the City Court of Physical injuries thru reckless imprudence to the CFI, and while the case was on appeal, the heirs of the victim filed an independent civil action against him and his employer in another branch, the civil action will prosper despite the lack of reservation. The restrictive interpretation of the Rules of Court provision on civil actions requiring reservation as to include the independent civil action under Art. 33 does not only result in the emasculation of the civil code provision but also gives rise to a serious constitutional question. Article 33 is quite clear. "The right to proceed independently of the criminal prosecution under Article 33 of the Civil Code is a SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT, not to be frittered away by a construction that could render it nugatory, if through oversight, the offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a civil suit. The grant of power to this Court, both in the present constitution and under the 1935 Charter, does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantive right.
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CASE DIGEST ON ABELLANA V. MARAVE [57 S 106 (1974)] - Where accused appealed his conviction by the City Court of Physical injuries thru reckless imprudence to the CFI, and while the case was on appeal, the heirs of the victim filed an independent civil action against him and his employer in another branch, the civil action will prosper despite the lack of reservation. The restrictive interpretation of the Rules of Court provision on civil actions requiring reservation as to include the independent civil action under Art. 33 does not only result in the emasculation of the civil code provision but also gives rise to a serious constitutional question. Article 33 is quite clear. "The right to proceed independently of the criminal prosecution under Article 33 of the Civil Code is a SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT, not to be frittered away by a construction that could render it nugatory, if through oversight, the offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a civil suit. The grant of power to this Court, both in the present constitution and under the 1935 Charter, does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantive right.
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CASE DIGEST ON REYES V. SEMPIO-DY
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CASE DIGEST ON REYES V. SEMPIO-DY [141 S 208 (1986)] - Where the private complainant in an information for intrigu-ing against honor was represented by a private prosecutor but defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a fine, a civil case damages is will prosper despite the lack of reservation and the intervention of a private prosecutor, because there was no opportunity to present evidence by reason of the unexpected plea of guilty.
Roa v. De La Cruz is not applicable because in that case, there was a full-blown hearing where a private prosecutor participatedly actively but failed to present evidence to support the claim for damages. Hence, a civil action could not prosper. Furthermore, under Art. 33, there is no require¬ment for reseervation to file an independent civil action arising from defamation.
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CASE DIGEST ON REYES V. SEMPIO-DY [141 S 208 (1986)] - Where the private complainant in an information for intrigu-ing against honor was represented by a private prosecutor but defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a fine, a civil case damages is will prosper despite the lack of reservation and the intervention of a private prosecutor, because there was no opportunity to present evidence by reason of the unexpected plea of guilty.
Roa v. De La Cruz is not applicable because in that case, there was a full-blown hearing where a private prosecutor participatedly actively but failed to present evidence to support the claim for damages. Hence, a civil action could not prosper. Furthermore, under Art. 33, there is no require¬ment for reseervation to file an independent civil action arising from defamation.
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CASE DIGEST ON PADILLA V. CA
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CASE DIGEST ON PADILLA V. CA [129 S 558 (1990)] - Where in the complaint for Grave Coercion against the mayor and policemen, they were acquitted on the ground that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, such acquittal will not bar a civil case for damages arising from the demolition of petition¬er's market stalls. The acquittal on the ground that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasona¬ble doubt refers to the element of Grave Coercion and not to the fact of that the stalls were not demolished. Under the Rules of Court, the extinction of penal action carries with it the extinction of civil only if there is a declaration that facts from which civil may arise did not exist. Also, Art. 29 of the Civil Code does not state that civil liability can be recovered only in a separate civil action. The civil liability can be recovered either in the same or a separate action. The purpose of recovering in the same action is to dispense with the filing of another civil action where the same evidence is to be presented, and the unsettling implications of permitting reinsti¬tuttion of a separate civil action. However, a separate civil action is warranted when (1) addition¬al facts are to be established; (2) there is more evidence to be adduced; (3) there is full termina¬tion of the criminal case and a separate complaint would be more efficacious than a remand. Hence, CA did not err in awarding damages despite the acquittal.
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CASE DIGEST ON PADILLA V. CA [129 S 558 (1990)] - Where in the complaint for Grave Coercion against the mayor and policemen, they were acquitted on the ground that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, such acquittal will not bar a civil case for damages arising from the demolition of petition¬er's market stalls. The acquittal on the ground that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasona¬ble doubt refers to the element of Grave Coercion and not to the fact of that the stalls were not demolished. Under the Rules of Court, the extinction of penal action carries with it the extinction of civil only if there is a declaration that facts from which civil may arise did not exist. Also, Art. 29 of the Civil Code does not state that civil liability can be recovered only in a separate civil action. The civil liability can be recovered either in the same or a separate action. The purpose of recovering in the same action is to dispense with the filing of another civil action where the same evidence is to be presented, and the unsettling implications of permitting reinsti¬tuttion of a separate civil action. However, a separate civil action is warranted when (1) addition¬al facts are to be established; (2) there is more evidence to be adduced; (3) there is full termina¬tion of the criminal case and a separate complaint would be more efficacious than a remand. Hence, CA did not err in awarding damages despite the acquittal.
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CASE DIGEST ON MENDOZA V. ARRIETA
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CASE DIGEST ON MENDOZA V. ARRIETA [91 S 113 (1979)] - Where in a multiple highway accident involving a truck which hit a jeep which then hit a Mercedes Benz coming from the opposite direction, two criminal actions for reckless imprudence was filed against the drivers of the truck and jeep, and the driver of the truck was found guilty and the driver of the jeep acquitted, a civil action for damages against the owner of the truck would prosper as there is no res judicata, the parties and causes of action being different. Furthermore, under Art. 31 of the Civil Code, When the civil action is based on an obli¬gation not arising from crime, the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceed¬ings regardless of result of the latter. Citing Garcia v. Florido,
"As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liabil¬ity arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligenc, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accord¬ance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proced independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 (requiring reservation of civil actions) with reference to Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedura, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso."
However, a civil action for damages against the owner-driver of the jeep would not prosper because civil liability arising from crime co-exists with criminal liability in criminal cases. Hence, the offended party had the option to prosecute on civil liability arising from crime or from quasi-delict. His active participation in the criminal case implies that he opted to recover the civil liability arising from crime. Hence, since the acquittal in the criminal case, which was not based on reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages can no longer be instituted.
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CASE DIGEST ON MENDOZA V. ARRIETA [91 S 113 (1979)] - Where in a multiple highway accident involving a truck which hit a jeep which then hit a Mercedes Benz coming from the opposite direction, two criminal actions for reckless imprudence was filed against the drivers of the truck and jeep, and the driver of the truck was found guilty and the driver of the jeep acquitted, a civil action for damages against the owner of the truck would prosper as there is no res judicata, the parties and causes of action being different. Furthermore, under Art. 31 of the Civil Code, When the civil action is based on an obli¬gation not arising from crime, the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceed¬ings regardless of result of the latter. Citing Garcia v. Florido,
"As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liabil¬ity arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligenc, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accord¬ance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proced independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 (requiring reservation of civil actions) with reference to Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedura, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso."
However, a civil action for damages against the owner-driver of the jeep would not prosper because civil liability arising from crime co-exists with criminal liability in criminal cases. Hence, the offended party had the option to prosecute on civil liability arising from crime or from quasi-delict. His active participation in the criminal case implies that he opted to recover the civil liability arising from crime. Hence, since the acquittal in the criminal case, which was not based on reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages can no longer be instituted.
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CASE DIGEST ON MENDOZA V. ALCALA
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CASE DIGEST ON MENDOZA V. ALCALA [2 S 1032 (1961)] - Where the accused in a criminal case for estafa is acquitted on the ground that the prosecution has not proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action based on the same transaction may prosper. (1) The conclusion that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt is equivalent to one of reasonable doubt. Thus, a civil action may prosper. (2) Under the Rules of Court, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of civil unless there is a declaration that fact from which civil is based did not exist. (3) Al¬though no reservation was made, the declaration in the criminal case that the obligation is purely civil amounts to a reservation of the civil action in favor of the offended party. (4) Furthermore, since estafa involves fraud, an independent civil action may prosper under Art. 33 of the Civil Code.
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CASE DIGEST ON MENDOZA V. ALCALA [2 S 1032 (1961)] - Where the accused in a criminal case for estafa is acquitted on the ground that the prosecution has not proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action based on the same transaction may prosper. (1) The conclusion that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt is equivalent to one of reasonable doubt. Thus, a civil action may prosper. (2) Under the Rules of Court, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of civil unless there is a declaration that fact from which civil is based did not exist. (3) Al¬though no reservation was made, the declaration in the criminal case that the obligation is purely civil amounts to a reservation of the civil action in favor of the offended party. (4) Furthermore, since estafa involves fraud, an independent civil action may prosper under Art. 33 of the Civil Code.
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CASE DIGEST ON AYER V. CAPULONG
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CASE DIGEST ON AYER V. CAPULONG [160 S 865 (1988) En Banc] - Senator Enrile cannot object to his inclusion in the movie on the EDSA Revolution by invoking his right to privacy. "The right of privacy or "he right to be let alone" is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elic¬ited from him or to be published about him constitutes matters of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The right of priivacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen."
As distinguished from Lagunzad v. Gonzales, which involved a film biography necessarily including at least his immediate family, the subject matter of the move in this case is one of public concern and does not relate to the individual or public life of Senator Enrile.
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machinations, or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damages.
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
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CASE DIGEST ON AYER V. CAPULONG [160 S 865 (1988) En Banc] - Senator Enrile cannot object to his inclusion in the movie on the EDSA Revolution by invoking his right to privacy. "The right of privacy or "he right to be let alone" is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elic¬ited from him or to be published about him constitutes matters of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The right of priivacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen."
As distinguished from Lagunzad v. Gonzales, which involved a film biography necessarily including at least his immediate family, the subject matter of the move in this case is one of public concern and does not relate to the individual or public life of Senator Enrile.
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machinations, or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damages.
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
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CASE DIGEST ON LAGUNZAD V. GONZALES
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CASE DIGEST ON LAGUNZAD V. GONZALES [92 S 476 (1979)] - An agreement whereby a film producer would pay the heirs and relatives of Moises Padilla a sum of money inorder to depict them in the movie which he included a love interest angle depicting the mother and a sweetheart, is not a violation of freedom of ex-pression. While it is true that the film producer purchased the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased's heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, "a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the charac¬ter and memory of the deceased."
"Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality."
"The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. However, it is limited by the clear and present danger rule and the balancing of interest test. The latter requires the court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interest observable in a given situation. The interests observable in this case are the right to privacy and freedom of expression. Taking into account the interplay of those interest, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations in the contract, the validity of such contract must be upheld because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern."
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CASE DIGEST ON LAGUNZAD V. GONZALES [92 S 476 (1979)] - An agreement whereby a film producer would pay the heirs and relatives of Moises Padilla a sum of money inorder to depict them in the movie which he included a love interest angle depicting the mother and a sweetheart, is not a violation of freedom of ex-pression. While it is true that the film producer purchased the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased's heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, "a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the charac¬ter and memory of the deceased."
"Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality."
"The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. However, it is limited by the clear and present danger rule and the balancing of interest test. The latter requires the court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interest observable in a given situation. The interests observable in this case are the right to privacy and freedom of expression. Taking into account the interplay of those interest, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations in the contract, the validity of such contract must be upheld because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern."
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CASE DIGEST ON GLOBE MACKAY V. CA
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CASE DIGEST ON GLOBE MACKAY V. CA [176 S 778 (1989)] - While an employer has the right to dismiss an employee who was involved in anomalous transactions, the right of dismissal should not be exercised in an abusive manner, such as by making accusations of being a crook, forcing him to take a forced leave, threat¬ening to file a hundred suits against him. Hence, the employer is liable for damages.
Art. 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. This article should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
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CASE DIGEST ON GLOBE MACKAY V. CA [176 S 778 (1989)] - While an employer has the right to dismiss an employee who was involved in anomalous transactions, the right of dismissal should not be exercised in an abusive manner, such as by making accusations of being a crook, forcing him to take a forced leave, threat¬ening to file a hundred suits against him. Hence, the employer is liable for damages.
Art. 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. This article should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
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CASE DIGEST ON BELLIS V. BELLIS
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CASE DIGEST ON BELLIS V. BELLIS [20 S 358 (1967)] - Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes is valid.
While Art. 17, par. 3 provides that prohibitive laws of our country concerning persons and their property shall not be rendered ineffective by contrary laws in a foreign country, this cannot be considered an exception to Art. 16 which categorically provides for the situations when the national law shall apply. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the Old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the New Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change Art. 10 paragraph 2 of the Old Civil Code as Art. 16 of the New Civil Code. It must have been their purpose to make Art. 16, paragraph 2, a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succes¬sions.
Thus, in Miciano v. Brimo, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Art. 10 - now Art. 16 - states said national law shall govern.
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case digest, case digests, supreme court case digests, supreme court case digest, pinaylawyer.com, www.pinaylawyer.com, case digest, case digest of, case digest on, supreme court case digest, supreme court case digests
case digest, case digests, supreme court case digests, supreme court case digest, pinaylawyer.com, www.pinaylawyer.com, case digest, case digest of, case digest on, supreme court case digest, supreme court case digests
CASE DIGEST ON BELLIS V. BELLIS [20 S 358 (1967)] - Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes is valid.
While Art. 17, par. 3 provides that prohibitive laws of our country concerning persons and their property shall not be rendered ineffective by contrary laws in a foreign country, this cannot be considered an exception to Art. 16 which categorically provides for the situations when the national law shall apply. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the Old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the New Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change Art. 10 paragraph 2 of the Old Civil Code as Art. 16 of the New Civil Code. It must have been their purpose to make Art. 16, paragraph 2, a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succes¬sions.
Thus, in Miciano v. Brimo, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Art. 10 - now Art. 16 - states said national law shall govern.
For more case digests visit http://www.pinaylawyer.com
case digest, case digests, supreme court case digests, supreme court case digest, pinaylawyer.com, www.pinaylawyer.com, case digest, case digest of, case digest on, supreme court case digest, supreme court case digests
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